Caught in the Crossfire

Innocent Bystanders” as Optimal Targets of Economic Sanctions

Bibliographic Data

ID6283731
AuthorsSolomon Major (Stanford University), Anthony J Mcgann (0000-0003-3297-1752, Department of Political Science, University of California, Irvine)
Year2005
Volume49
Issue3
Pages337-359
Publication date2005-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002705276568
OpenAlexW2144344095
LanguageEN
Citations received25
References cited25

Current sanctions orthodoxy argues that groups' ability to set policy depends on their total budget. According to such a perspective, successful sanctions must target the unfriendly within the target countries while shielding “innocent bystanders” from harm. The authors argue that the focus on groups' aggregate budget constraint and the war-of-attrition view of policy formation misconceives of how policies are determined. The most effective groups to sanction will be those whose spending has the greatest marginal effect on policy. The authors show that this will often be the very innocent bystanders that prevailing theories have argued must be protected. Although this conclusion is conditional on their level of institutional empowerment and their having sufficient resources to make an impact on policy if properly motivated, when these initial conditions are met, a sanctions design can be specified with a high degree of prospective utility for sender states

Constraint (computer-aided design · Economics · Harm · Incentive · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Perspective (graphical · Political science · Positive economics · Public economics · Sanctions · Computer Science · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence

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