Investor–State Disputes
When Can Governments Break Contracts
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6283733 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Rachel L Wellhausen (0000-0002-7430-9997, Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin, TX, USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 239-261 |
| Publication date | 2015-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002713503299 |
| OpenAlex | W2097058413 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 35 |
| References cited | 55 |
Since 1990, governments around the developing world have broken contracts made with multinational corporations (MNCs), but the incidence of breach varies across countries and over time. I argue that shared firm nationality is a key determinant of contract sanctity. MNCs are likely to divert investments or exit in response to breach with a firm of the same nationality but unlikely to react in ways costly to the host government otherwise. At the level of the economy as a whole, host governments gain permissive space to trade-off among national groups of investors when a greater diversity of foreign direct investment nationalities is present. I use national-, firm-, and dyadic-level data from 1990 to 2008 to demonstrate nationality-tied firm responses to breach. Counterintuitively, deeper integration with more nationally diverse MNCs enables more breach, as governments gain space to prioritize other goals over the property and preferences of foreign capital
Business · Capital (architecture · Diversity (politics · Economics · Foreign direct investment · Government (linguistics · Immigration · International trade · Market economy · Multinational corporation · Nationality · Political science · Space (punctuation) · State (computer science · Corporate Finance and Governance · Finance · International Arbitration and Investment Law · International Business and FDI · Law
Democracy, Debt, and the Bench
Double jeopardy
The Shield of Nationality
The effects of political and legal constraints on expropriation in natural resource and manufacturing sectors
All Things Work Together for Good
The political economy of national development
How Investor Portfolios Shape Regulatory Outcomes
Autocratic regime survival, regime instability, and foreign asset expropriation
States Sued
Populism, Party Ideology, and Economic Expropriations
Contracting with Whom? The Differential Effects of Investment Treaties on FDI
Climbing to the Top? How Globalized Competition for Capital Affects Judicial Independence
Locating the External Source of Enforceability
Foreignness as an Asset
Bondholders vs. Direct Investors? Competing Responses to Expropriation
International Investment Law and Foreign Direct Reinvestment
When Do States Believe in Treaties? Legalization, Commitment, and Institutional Externality
Do Not Forget About Politics! Explaining the Selective Breach of Bilateral Investment Treaties
Unsolicited justice
Predictability Versus Flexibility
Heterogeneity in How Investors Respond to Disputes
The Effects of Economic Sanctions on Foreign Asset Expropriation
The Devil’s Haircut
Even Constrained Governments Take
Political Risk Insurance
Global sources of credibility
Dyads Are Dead, Long Live Dyads! The Limits of Dyadic Designs in International Relations Research
Leaders and Default
Partners with Benefits
Personal Networks, State Financial Backing, and Foreign Direct Investment
Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment
Expropriation as reparation
Investor Rights versus Human Rights
Do Investor–State Disputes (Still) Harm FDI
Under One Roof
The International Operations of National Firms
Politics and International Investment
Has Globalization Gone Too Far?
Political capabilities, policy risk, and international investment strategy
Notes on Cepii’s Distances Measures
Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? Decentralization, Globalization, and Public Policy
Longitudinal Data Analysis for Discrete and Continuous Outcomes
The Retreat of the State
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Has Globalization Gone Too Far
The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment
The MID3 Data Set, 1993—2001
Trading Data
The international operations of national firms
Sovereign defaulters
What matters for financial development? Capital controls, institutions, and interactions
Sovereignty
Multinational Corporations
Following the Flag
The Effect of Sanctions on U.S. Foreign Direct Investment
Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment
A Violent Future? Political Risk Insurance Markets and Violence Forecasts
Three Waves of BITs
Why Should I Believe You? The Costs and Consequences of Bilateral Investment Treaties
Delegating Differences
Inequality, Institutions, and the Risks to Foreign Investment1
Room to Move
Contingent Credibility
International investment and colonial control
Reversal of Fortunes
Competing for Capital
Democracy, Autocracy, and Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investment
If You’re Against Them You’re With Us
Political Risk, Reputation, and the Resource Curse
The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries
Making the Most of Statistical Analyses
Foreign Direct Investment, Regime Type, and Labor Protest in Developing Countries
Political Institutions and Economic Policies
Familiarity Breeds Investment
| Unique citing works | 35 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,92 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2026 (13) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 35 |