Temptation and the Maintenance of Trust
Effects of Bilateral Punishment Capability
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6283773 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Byron A Matthews (Department of Sociology, University of Maryland, Baltimore County), William M Kordonski (Psychological Health Services, Columbia, Maryland), Eliot Shimoff (Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, Baltimore County) |
| Ano | 1983 |
| Volume | 27 |
| Fascículo | 2 |
| Páginas | 255-277 |
| Data de publicação | 1983-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Editora | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002783027002003 |
| OpenAlex | W2055607995 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 3 |
| Referências citadas | 20 |
Levels of trust, defined by how far ahead in earnings each dyad member risked putting the other, were continuously monitored during two-party exchange. Two experiments investigated whether a bilateral punishment capability would enable trust to be maintained when a strong incentive to be untrustworthy (temptation) was introduced. In Experiment I (total subtraction), both persons were provided with a “start over” button that could set the other person's session earnings to zero. In Experiment II (partial subtraction), the start over button was replaced by a “subtraction” button that subtracted ten points from the other's earnings. All pairs had previously demonstrated either unwillingness to trust or untrustworthy behavior during temptation. Experiment I found that the availability of the total substraction option allowed trust to be maintained in four of six pairs. In Experiment II, partial subtraction had similar effects for three of six pairs. A bilateral punishment capacity may thus facilitate the maintenance of trust under conditions that otherwise produce distrust and exploitation
Arithmetic · Distrust · Dyad · Earnings · Economics · Incentive · Microeconomics · Punishment (psychology · Set (abstract data type · Subtraction · Temptation · Accounting · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematics · Psychology · Psychology of Social Influence · Social Psychology
Cooperation
Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations
Communication in interpersonal bargaining.
The Resolution of Conflict
The Effect of Motivational Orientation upon Trust and Suspicion
Magnitude and precision of punitive power in bargaining strategy
The effects of different magnitudes of threat upon interpersonal bargaining
Expansion of Exchange
Temptation and threat in non-zero-sum games
Effects of programmed strategies on cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma and other mixed-motive games
Elicitation of Cooperation by Retaliatory and Nonretaliatory Strategies in a Mixed-Motive Game
Opponent's personality, expectation of social interaction, and interpersonal bargaining
Proxemic effects on cooperation, attitude, and approach-avoidance in a Prisoner's Dilemma game
Effects of punishment magnitude in the bilateral threat situation
Cooperation and interpersonal risk
Trust and suspicion
Trust development, the GRIT proposal, and the effects of conciliatory acts on conflict and cooperation
Group influence on individual risk taking
| Obras citantes distintas | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,07 |
| Intervalo de citações | 1985 - 2015 (31) |
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 3 |