Rational Theories of Participation
An Exercise in Definitions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284055 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Louise G White (School of Government and Public Administration American University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1976 |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 255-278 |
| Publication date | 1976-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200277602000204 |
| OpenAlex | W2042046854 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 31 |
In assessing the usefulness of economic models for political analysis, it is necessary to begin by defining the elements in the models. The present study looks at various ways to define “utility” or the goals of political activity, and how to operationalize the difference between private and public goals. Only when these are made precise can economic models be useful in predicting when and why people will act on their interests in politics. Some research is presented to explore the merits of different definitions of utility. The conclusion drawn is that economic models are most useful when they work with limited and clearly specified definitions of goals for political activity. In this way they can perform a predictive and diagnostic function. At the same time, it is likely that substantive changes in our collective life will have to emerge from other models of human behavior
Economics · Epistemology · Function (biology · Operationalization · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Sociology · Work (physics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Social and Cultural Dynamics
The symbolic uses of politics
Political Leadership and Collective Goods
Sociologists, economists and democracy
An economic theory of democracy
The Calculus of Consent
A Theory of Justice
Rational-Choice Models of Political Behavior vs. Functionalist and Conformist Theories
The Logic of Collective Action
Rational-Choice Models of Political Behavior vs. Functionalist and Conformist Theories
Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories
The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure
A Comment on the Pure Theory of Public Expenditure
Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure
A note on collective goods and the theory of political entrepreneurship
Congress, The Electoral Connection
Congress
American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory
Why The Government Budget Is Too Small in a Democracy
Empirical Political Theory & the Image of Man
Rationality & Political Science
The Tragedy of the Commons
The City in the Future of Democracy
Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior
A Theory of the Calculus of Voting
Motivation, Incentive Systems, and the Political Party Organization
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,03 |
| Citation span | 1993 - 1993 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |