Testing Two Explanations of the Liberal Peace
The Opportunity Cost and Signaling Arguments
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6284058 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Nam Kyu Kim (0000-0003-0621-4192, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2014 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Fascículo | 5 |
| Páginas | 894-919 |
| Data de publicação | 2014-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Editora | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002713484280 |
| OpenAlex | W2164697049 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 8 |
| Referências citadas | 60 |
Considerable evidence suggests that economic interdependence and integration reduce the likelihood of militarized conflict. However, scholars have devoted remarkably scant attention to testing different explanations of the liberal peace. This article offers an empirical test that can help adjudicate the two main arguments on the liberal peace: the opportunity cost and signaling arguments. Under the incomplete information assumption, I derive different observable implications of the competing arguments regarding how target states respond when challenged. By estimating selection models comprising dispute initiation and reciprocation, I find that, as challengers are more dependent on bilateral trade, targets are less likely to reciprocate disputes, which is supportive of the signaling argument. Regarding dispute initiation, increases in foreign direct investment and financial openness are associated with a decrease in the probability of conflict initiation. Last, the pacifying effects of the liberal economic variables are much more pronounced in contiguous and major dyads than in other dyads
Adjudication · Argument (complex analysis · Economic interdependence · Economics · Law and economics · Malleability · Openness to experience · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · International Development and Aid · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Social Psychology
Economic interdependence and the likelihood of war – a systematic literature review
Wartime Commercial Policy and Trade between Enemies
Enforcing Openness
When does liberal peace fail? Trade and nationalism
Extended Dependence
IMF Programs and the Risk of a Coup d’état
A Liberal Peace
The Spillover Effect of the Trade War between Adversarial Dyads
In the Shadow of Power
The Invisible Hand of Peace
The Liberal Illusion
Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett. 1993. “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986.” American Political Science Review 87 (September)
Designing Social Inquiry
The MID 3 data set, 1993–2001
Collateral Damage
Make Trade Not War
The MID3 Data Set, 1993—2001
Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992
The Liberal Peace Revisited
Eugene
International Crises and the Capitalist Peace
Taking Time Seriously
Endogeneity in Probit Response Models
Trade Still Follows the Flag
Size Asymmetry, Trade, and Militarized Conflict
Expanded Trade and GDP Data
Conflict and Trade
The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict
Winning with the Bomb
The Study of Interdependence and Conflict
War and the World Economy
Information and Economic Interdependence
Economic Interdependence and International Conflict
The Nexus of Market Society, Liberal Preferences, and Democratic Peace
The Classical Liberals Were Right
War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand
Rationalist explanations for war
Autocratic Audience Costs
Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War
Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations
How Opportunity Costs Decrease the Probability of War in an Incomplete Information Game
Investing in the Peace
Decomposing the Relationship Between Contiguity and Militarized Conflict
War and Rivalry among Great Powers
The Effects of Strategic and Economic Interdependence on International Conflict Across Levels of Analysis
A Unified Statistical Model of Conflict Onset and Escalation
The Capitalist Peace
Making the Most of Statistical Analyses
A New Measure of Financial Openness
Why Do Neighbors Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality
Democracy, Interdependence, and the Sources of the Liberal Peace
How Could Trade Affect Conflict
Measuring Alliances
Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications
Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data
Trade does promote peace
Foreign direct investment and militarized international conflict
Institutional Instability and the Credibility of Audience Costs
Trade networks and the Kantian peace
Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986
Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918-94
Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict
The Political Determinants of International Trade
Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes
Information, Power, and War
| Obras citantes distintas | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,89 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2017 - 2025 (9) |
| Velocidade de citação | recent |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 8 |