Terrorism as a Desperate Game
Fear, Bargaining, and Communication in the Terrorist Event
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284093 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jerome R Corsi (Department of Political Science University of Denver, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1981 |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 47-85 |
| Publication date | 1981-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200278102500103 |
| OpenAlex | W2067121497 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 15 |
| References cited | 22 |
This article examines terrorism both theoretically and empirically. A typology is presented to identify different types of terrorist events and characteristics particular to each. Following this, the negotiations involved in hostage situations are examined with emphasis on government / terrorist response options and event outcomes. Throughout the article, assumptions of the theoretical model are empirically tested utilizing the ITERATE data set. Decision routes are mapped as a method for conceptualizing the tactics involved in bargaining communications. Formal game theory is utilized to explore the complexities involved in modeling government/terrorist interaction regarding: (a) developing an extensive game form; (b) specifying utilities; and (c) constructing illustrative games. Probability functions for an empirically-based decision model are generated by an examination of government/ terrorist responses and outcomes for the cases in the data set. Discriminant function analysis is employed to specify quantitatively the degree to which theoretically identified types are distinct as posited. The argument presented emphasizes the significance of the communications (implicit and direct, calculated and manipulative) which result from the terrorist/target bargaining interaction
Argument (complex analysis · Computer security · Economics · Event (particle physics · Function (biology · Game theory · Government (linguistics · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Political science · Set (abstract data type · Sociology · Terrorism · Typology · Computer Science · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
Situational Predictors of Negotiation and Violence in Hostage and Barricade Incidents
Rational Fools or Foolish Rationalists
Le emergenze umanitarie complesse
Contrasting Dynamics of Crisis Negotiations
Testing the Role Effect in Terrorist Negotiations
The Logic of Terrorist Target Choice
Revealing the process and outcome of hostage negotiations
Hiperterrorismo e mídia na comunicação política
Fighting Political Terrorism by Refusing Recognition
Comment — Terrorists, Governments, and Numbers
Toward a Model of Terrorist Behavior in Hostage-Taking Incidents
Terrorist Decision Making
Integrating the Policy Models of Terrorism and Emergency Management
Hostage Taking
A Theoretical Analysis of Transnational Terrorism
Two-person game theory
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (60th Anniversary Commemorative Edition)
Discriminant Analysis
Games and Decisions
Causal inferences in nonexperimental research
Resistance and Revolution
Terrorism and the Liberal State
Ecological Inference
Elementary Decision Theory
The victim of terrorism
Negotiations for hostages
Games and Programs
Games for Society, Business and War
Just and Unjust Wars
Terror and Resistance
Toward a Theory of Revolution
Terror and Resistance
| Unique citing works | 15 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,35 |
| Citation span | 1983 - 2021 (39) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 15 |