War and Default

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6284168
AutoresPatrick E Shea (0000-0002-5051-4443, University of Houston, autor correspondente), Paul Poast (0000-0001-8930-2758, University of Chicago)
Ano2018
Volume62
Fascículo9
Páginas1876-1904
Data de publicação2018-10-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002717707239
OpenAlexW2620766876
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas17
Referências citadas61

Sovereign borrowing is often used to cover the costs of war. This borrowing, coupled with war’s economic disruptions, strains states’ ability to honor debt promises. Contrary to conventional expectations, however, we find that default is not common after wars. To explain the relationship between war and sovereign default, this article lays out a selection effect argument: war participants are unlikely to default in the first place, while states likely to default are unable to acquire the financing necessary to fight a war. In sum, states that lack the financial means to adequately borrow avoid paths to war. After offering some examples of the selection mechanism at work, we present evidence that states unlikely to default will avoid entering the war sample. Our findings have implications for the inferences researchers make about war finance and war onset

Argument (complex analysis · Debt · Default · Economics · Honor · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sample (material · Selection (genetic algorithm · Sovereign debt · Sovereign default · Sovereignty · Spanish Civil War · World War II · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Finance · Law · Natural Resources and Economic Development · State Capitalism and Financial Governance