Soviet Military and Civilian Resource Allocation 1951-1980
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284205 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Paul M Johnson (0000-0003-2519-756X, Florida State University), Robert A Wells (0000-0002-0872-6899, University of New Orleans), R Wells (University of New Orleans) |
| Year | 1986 |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 195-219 |
| Publication date | 1986-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002786030002001 |
| OpenAlex | W2002647426 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 7 |
The “guns versus butter” literature focuses mainly on the industrialized capitalist democracies and has reported little success in empirically substantiating the existence of durable trade-off relationships between military spending and particular civilian programs during peacetime. This article identifies structural features of Soviet-type politicoeconomic systems that make them more likely to display such durable trade-offs and then demonstrates the point by multiple regression time-series estimation of the effects of changing rates of growth in Soviet military spending on 13 major civilian programs during the period 1951-1980, controlling for demographic, economic growth, and leadership succession effects. Despite considerable noise in the Soviet military spending data, substantial and robust trade-off phenomena are demonstrated only for housing construction and the production of durable consumer goods, whereas ideologically favored programs for productive investment and social spending (except perhaps old-age pensions) appear to have been much less affected by marginal changes in military spending
Development economics · Durable good · Economics · Estimation · Investment (military · Macroeconomics · Peacetime · Political science · Politics · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Russia and Soviet political economy
Keys to a Unified Theory of Warfare and Arms Races
How much is enough? Psychological components of "guns versus butter" decisions in a security dilemma
The Soviet Defence Burden and Arms Control
The Nuclear Arms Race
Richardson, Rationality, and Restrictive Models of Arms Races
The Security-Welfare Relationship
Change and Stability in Superpower Rivalry
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,18 |
| Citation span | 1987 - 1991 (5) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |