Large Group Bargaining in a Characteristic Function Game
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284279 |
|---|---|
| Authors | J Keith Murnighan (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign), Alvin E Roth (0000-0002-8834-6481, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign) |
| Year | 1978 |
| Volume | 22 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 299-317 |
| Publication date | 1978-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200277802200206 |
| OpenAlex | W2155318308 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 15 |
This paper presents the results of an n-person characteristic function game played by between seven and and twelve players, one of whom was a monopolist. A factorial design allowed for analysis of the effects of group size, the availability of information, and communication opportunities for a series of seven trials. The data were compared to the game theoretic concepts of the core and Shapley value, (Shapley, 1953, Roth, 1977a), and to the predictions of the Weighted Probability model (Komorita, 1974). The findings indicated that the monopolist held a great deal of power, especially when communication among the players was not allowed. His payoffs increased over trials and approached the core in all of the conditions except when communicaion was available in seven and eight-person groups. The overall results were very close to the Shapley value and the predictions of the Weighted Probability model. The results were compared to an earlier study on a similar three-person game; increasing the group size seemed to be the primary case of the increase in the monopolist's payoffs
Bargaining power · Core (optical fiber · Econometrics · Economics · Function (biology · Game theory · Group (periodic table · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Shapley Value · Statistics · Telecommunications · Value (mathematics · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics
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| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,15 |
| Citation span | 1978 - 2022 (45) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |