Bargaining in ignorance of the opponent's utility function
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284467 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John C Harsanyi (Wayne State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1962 |
| Volume | 6 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 29-38 |
| Publication date | 1962-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200276200600104 |
| OpenAlex | W1972171971 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 24 |
| References cited | 6 |
1 The original version of this paper was written at the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University, under Contract Nonr-358 (01), NR 047-006 of the Cowles Foundation with the Office of Naval Research. It was distributed as Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 46. A revised version of this paper was presented at the Princeton Conference on Game Theory and Negotiations in October, 1961. The paper has benefited from comments by the other participants of the Conference. 2 But of course there are exceptions. For a model dealing with the case where the players do not know one another's utility functions, see (Luce and Adams, 1956). know (and know they do not know) each other's utility functions. I shall also indicate some interesting problems our analysis raises for empirical research
Adversary · Computer security · Economics · Function (biology · Ignorance · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Positive economics · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law
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| Unique citing works | 24 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,41 |
| Citation span | 1967 - 2024 (58) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 23 |