Knowing Your Enemy

Information and Commitment Problems in Civil Wars

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6284648
AutoresShanna A Kirschner (Allegheny College, Meadville, PA, USA,), Shanna Kirschner (0000-0002-1261-4398, Allegheny College, autor correspondente)
Ano2010
Volume54
Fascículo5
Páginas745-770
Data de publicação2010-10-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002710372753
OpenAlexW2143220386
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas15
Referências citadas56

When do civil wars last especially long? Commitment problems can stymie conflict resolution but they are not homogeneous across all civil wars. Indeed, combatants’ perceptions of their adversaries significantly affect the severity of commitment problems. Intergroup interactions provide combatants with one crucial type of information about their adversaries and about the risks associated with signing a peace settlement, shaping strategic decisions. The argument is tested against a new data set of all ethnic civil wars between 1945 and 2004. The results demonstrate that intergroup interactions prolong wars when they indicate that a peace deal will be especially fragile or that the costs of it breaking down will be especially high. This is true, regardless of the combatants’ goals or their capabilities. In sum, information shapes perceptions and the severity of commitment problems, in turn affecting the duration of civil wars

Adversary · Argument (complex analysis · Civil Conflict · Computer security · Conflict resolution · Economics · Ethnic group · Law and economics · Perception · Political economy · Political science · Set (abstract data type · Settlement (finance · Sociology · Spanish Civil War · Computer Science · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Social Psychology · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence