The Political Cost of War Mobilization in Democracies and Dictatorships
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284691 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jeff Carter (0000-0001-7681-4973, Department of Political Science, The University of Mississippi, University, MS, USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 61 |
| Issue | 8 |
| Pages | 1768-1794 |
| Publication date | 2017-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002715620469 |
| OpenAlex | W3125034892 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 12 |
| References cited | 69 |
Recent research concludes fighting or losing an interstate war is not costlier for democratic leaders than dictators, which implies most of our institutional explanations for differences in conflict behavior across regime type rest on empirically tenuous assumptions. I argue military mobilization, a fundamental but often overlooked aspect of war, should be costlier for democrats than dictators. Waging interstate war is associated with higher military spending and, often, lower social spending. Variation across regime type in the representation of the general public, civilian elite, and military in leaders’ winning coalitions should make democrats more likely than dictators to lose power given wartime patterns of government spending. This argument finds support during the period from 1950 to 2001. My findings provide microfoundations for a number of existing empirical results and suggest that differences in the conflict behavior of democracies and dictatorships should be largest when waging war requires a significant mobilization effort
Argument (complex analysis · Authoritarianism · Democracy · Development economics · Dictatorship · Economics · Elite · Government (linguistics · Keynesian economics · Microfoundations · Mobilization · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · International Development and Aid · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
How States Die
Assessment of Conflict between India and Pakistan
Declarations of Intent
When States Resist
Political leaders and military spending
Introduction to special issue
Shifting power, interstate war, and domestic politics
The democratic patience
Leader Hawkishness, Political Survival, and Interstate Crises
Military Labor Systems, Domestic Politics, and the Battlefield
War as a Redistributive Problem
A Framework for Measuring Leaders' Willingness to Use Force
The Formation of national States in Western Europe
Triangulating Peace
Polyarchy
Paradigms and Sand Castles
Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy
A Study of Crisis
Amelia II
Democracy and Development
Democracies at War
Leaders and International Conflict
The Logic of Political Survival
Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys
The Logic of Collective Action
The War Ledger
Event History Modeling
Democracy and Redistribution
The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure
Selectorate theory, the democratic peace, and public goods provision
Sustaining the Fight
A Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society
Distinctive Military Attitudes among U.S. Enlistees, 1976-1997
The All-Volunteer Force
Soldiers in Politics
An Economic Theory of Clubs
Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy
The Dilemma of Rising Demands and Insufficient Resources
Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War
A Unified Model of War Onset and Outcome
Bear Any Burden? How Democracies Minimize the Costs of War
Understanding Interaction Models
Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans
Which Way Out
Sensitivity to Costs of Fighting versus Sensitivity to Losing the Conflict
Looking for Audience Costs
Expanded Trade and GDP Data
Democratic Inefficiency? Regime Type and Suboptimal Choices in International Politics
The Declining Advantages of Democracy
Kantian Liberalism, Regime Type, and Military Resource Allocation
Keeping the Schools Open While the Troops are Away
Survival and Accountability
Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicative Interaction Terms
Rationalist explanations for war
Autocratic Audience Costs
What to Do about Missing Values in Time‐Series Cross‐Section Data
Duration Models and Proportional Hazards in Political Science
International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders
Contingent Prize Allocation and Pivotal Voting
Defense Effort and Institutional Theories of Democratic Peace and Victory Why Try Harder
Preference Gaps and Inequality in Representation
Democracy and the Logic of Political Survival
Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data
War and the Survival of Political Leaders
Introducing Archigos
Armed Conflict 1946-2001
Strongmen and Straw Men
Borrowed Power
Military Coercion in Interstate Crises
Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War
An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace
Powerful Pacifists
The Decider's Dilemma
What Makes People Support Public Responsibility for Welfare Provision
| Unique citing works | 12 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,5 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2025 (8) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 12 |