Legislative Constraints

A Path to Peace

Bibliographic Data

ID6284871
AuthorsSeung-Whan Choi (0000-0002-4984-1973, University of Illinois Chicago, corresponding author)
Year2010
Volume54
Issue3
Pages438-470
Publication date2010-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002709357889
OpenAlexW2104463552
LanguageEN
Citations received21
References cited55

Tsebelis’ veto players theory predicts that legislative veto players constrain the executive’s political decisions because their approval is needed to implement policy change. This study extends the veto players argument into international conflict literature, specifically in regard to legislative constraints emanating from the number of legislative veto players, their policy preferences, and their internal cohesion. A cross-sectional, time-series dyadic data analysis shows that, in general, an increase of legislative constraints notably reduces the likelihood of the onset of militarized interstate disputes. However, while legislative constraints in democratic and mixed dyads are likely to discourage democratic executives’ use of force, those in autocratic dyads do not produce effective pacifying effects

Argument (complex analysis · Autocracy · Democracy · Economics · Law and economics · Legislature · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Veto · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Political Conflict and Governance · Public Administration

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