The Information Dilemma
Private Information as a Cause of Transaction Failure in Markets, Regulation, Hierarchy, and Politics
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6285223 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Otto Keck (International Institute for Environment and Society, Science Center Berlin, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1987 |
| Volume | 31 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 139-163 |
| Publication date | 1987-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002787031001008 |
| OpenAlex | W2056394690 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 39 |
Information asymmetries persist because in certain situations the value of information cannot be appropriated by the one who has it. A game-theoretic model of information asymmetries is presented, showing that under certain conditions there exists a prisoner's dilemma. The model is used to clarify the failure of markets to transmit certain types of information, to explain policy failure in regulation without recourse to government failure, and to identify new types of transaction failure in hierarchy and politics
Business · Complete information · Coordination failure · Database transaction · Dilemma · Economics · Epistemology · Game theory · Government (linguistics · Hierarchy · Information asymmetry · Law and economics · Market economy · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Perfect information · Political science · Politics · Prisoner's dilemma · Transaction cost · Value (mathematics · Value of information · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications
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| Citations per year | 0.08 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1990 - 2000 (11) |
| Highly cited | No |