Preventive War and the Balance of Power
A Game-Theoretic Approach
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6285232 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Emerson M S Niou (Department of Political Science, State University of New York at Stony Brook), Peter C Ordeshook (Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin, Division of Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology) |
| Year | 1987 |
| Volume | 31 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 387-419 |
| Publication date | 1987-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002787031003001 |
| OpenAlex | W2135214263 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 14 |
| References cited | 6 |
Preventive wars are commonly defined as wars initiated by a major power to preempt an anticipated disadvantageous position in terms of resources or military capabilities owing to the differential growth rates of countries. This essay extends a game-theoretic model of the balance of power to admit differential growth rates and also to permit countries to adjust their investments for the future. After establishing the conditions for equilibrium investment strategies, we then examine the properties of the nation-system that this equilibrium implies. Specifically, using a two-period model, we are interested in those first-period equilibria in which, because their sovereignty is subsequently threatened, countries will prefer to instigate a preventive war. We conclude by arguing that, although differential growth rates and the period 1 equilibria that initial resources imply can threaten the sovereignty of countries, there are a variety of coalitional strategies available to countries and that only some of them imply preventive war
Balance (ability · Circulation (fluid dynamics · Development economics · Differential (mechanical device · Economic system · Economics · Investment (military · Political science · Position (finance · Power (physics · Sovereignty · Variety (cybernetics · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Finance · Law · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East
A Theory of the Balance of Power
Power and Cooperation
Power Transition and Conflict Initiation
Rational choice models and international relations research
National Preferences, International Structures and Balance-of-Power Politics
Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula
Domestic Structure and Preventive War
Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War
Realpolitik and the Bases of Multistate System Endurance
International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War
Shifting Power, Commitment Problems, and Preventive War
Neorealism and the myth of bipolar stability
Guns, Butter, and Anarchy
Stability in Anarchic International Systems
| Unique citing works | 14 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,36 |
| Citation span | 1987 - 2017 (31) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 14 |