Political Development and the Fragmentation of Protection Markets

Politically Affiliated Gangs in Indonesia

Bibliographic Data

ID6285438
AuthorsYuhki Tajima (0000-0001-5672-6730, Georgetown University, corresponding author)
Year2018
Volume62
Issue5
Pages1100-1126
Publication date2018-05-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002716669810
OpenAlexW2524649144
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited23

Why do gangs proliferate during democratization and decline in number during authoritarian consolidation? I utilize primary evidence of two Indonesian gangs to inform a model of protection gangs under varying states of political development. Modeling gangs as territorial firms under different regulatory conditions, I attribute their number and political affiliation to the interaction between state capacity and political fragmentation. In weak states, gangs will lack political affiliations and their number will be determined by the scalability of their coercive capacities. In countries where states have the capacity to significantly constrain gangs, but lack significant costs for politicians to associate with them, gangs will seek political affiliation, trading coercive services for lax law enforcement. In such contexts, their number will be determined by state factionalization. Thus, gangs proliferate during democratization due to more political actors sharing state control. I assess the theory examining Indonesia’s history of statebuilding and political transition

Authoritarianism · Consolidation (business · Democracy · Democratic consolidation · Democratization · Economic system · Economics · Enforcement · Fragmentation (computing · Political economy · Political science · Politics · State (computer science · Crime Patterns and Interventions · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Sex work and related issues

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