Dynamic Volunteer's Dilemmas over a Finite Horizon

An Experimental Study

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6285572
AutoresHironori Otsubo (0000-0003-0569-6302, Strategic Interaction Group, Max Planck Institute of Economics), Amnon Rapoport (0000-0003-1508-0771, University of Arizona)
Año2008
Volumen52
Número6
Páginas961-984
Fecha de publicación2008-12-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002708321401
OpenAlexW2166893019
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas3
Referencias citadas17

Volunteer's dilemmas that evolve over time are presented and modeled as noncooperative n-person games in extensive form with symmetric players, discrete time, finite horizon, and complete information. Volunteering is costly, thereby giving rise to free riding. Reflecting on the observation that in many naturally occurring social dilemmas it is beneficial to volunteer earlier than later, the model assumes that the payoff to the volunteer and the (higher) payoff to each of the nonvolunteers decrease monotonically over time. The authors construct symmetric and asymmetric subgame perfect equilibria to the game. An experimental study shows that financially motivated subjects who are rewarded contingent on their performance volunteer more readily when the cost of volunteering is relatively low; that they largely fail to coordinate on any of the asymmetric equilibria in which only a single subject volunteers immediately; that they volunteer, on average, earlier than predicted; and that they vary considerably from one another in their inclination to free ride

Altruism (biology · Economics · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Stochastic game · Subgame perfect equilibrium · Volunteer · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Psychology · Social Psychology