Sources of Bureaucratic Influence

Expertise and Agenda Control

Bibliographic Data

ID6285589
AuthorsMichael F Altfeld, Gary J Miller (Michigan State University)
Year1984
Volume28
Issue4
Pages701-730
Publication date1984-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002784028004006
OpenAlexW2105666324
LanguageEN
Citations received20
References cited11

Classical Weberian models of bureaucratic influence emphasize expertise as a source of political power. Recent economic models suggest that bureaucratic expertise springs from control over the agenda of voting bodies. This article differentiates the two types of bureaucratic influence and reports on a series of experiments that varies the amount of expertise and agenda control in the same committee decision-making setting. Initial results indicate that either a monopoly on information or a monopoly on agenda control can enable an outsider to influence committee choices away from what would otherwise be the majority winning alternative for the committee. The different sources of bureaucratic influence are exercised in different, possibly mutually exclusive ways, so that both kinds of monopoly do not necessarily help the bureaucrat any more than one kind of influence by itself. The reason seems to be that agenda control is based on a combative, bargaining relationship between the convener and the committee, whereas expertise seems to be based on building a professional relationship of trust between expert and committee

Bureaucracy · Control (management · Economics · Law and economics · Management · Microeconomics · Monopoly · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Public relations · Voting · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Economic Theory and Institutions · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Public Administration

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