Alliance Formation and General Deterrence
A Game-Theoretic Model and the Case of Israel
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6285743 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gerald L Sorokin (University of Iowa, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1994 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 298-325 |
| Publication date | 1994-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002794038002006 |
| OpenAlex | W2031883788 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 27 |
| References cited | 18 |
This article studies the relationship between alliance formation and general deterrence in regional rivalries. In a game-theoretic model under complete information, an alliance is formed only when the potential ally would not intervene without one and would always intervene with one. General deterrence succeeds under complete information unless the potential attacker is stronger than the target and values the stakes highly, and the potential ally would never intervene. When incomplete information is added to the game, alliances are sometimes formed even when the potential ally's behavior would be unaffected by the alliance. Additionally, general deterrence under incomplete information sometimes fails because of the potential attacker's mistaken beliefs about the probability that the target would win or the potential ally would intervene. The model is illustrated by examining the conflict between Israel and its rivals, Egypt and Syria, taking into account the role of the United States as Israel's potential ally. The combination of game theory and empirical analysis is theoretically richer and empirically more informative than previous analyses of Israeli general deterrence and alliance behavior
Alliance · Complete information · Deterrence (psychology · Deterrence theory · Economics · Game theory · International conflict · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
Structural Realism and the Causes of War
Deterrence Now
When Weak States Win
Japan is back”
Violence in the “balance”
Arms Transfers beyond the State-to-State Realm
A new spear in Asia
The restraint effect of alliances on military responses during crises
Alliance Formation and the Timing of War Involvement
General Deterrence and International Conflict
Toward a Network Theory of Alliance Formation
Patrons, clients, and allies in the Arab‐Israeli conflict
Arms Transfers and Extended Deterrence
Understanding the ‘War on Terrorism’
Intra-Alliance Bargaining and U.S. Bosnia Policy
Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power
Arms, Alliances, and Security Tradeoffs in Enduring Rivalries
To Protect and to Serve
Multiple Goals or Deterrence
Political System Similarity And The Choice of Allies
Alignment Patterns, Crisis Bargaining, and Extended Deterrence
Reliability, Reputation, and Alliance Formation1
Explaining Wars of Choice
Quasi alliance explanation for the fluctuating ROK-Japan relationship
Fading Friendships
Intimate enemies
Alliances and Perception Profiles in the Iranian Reform Movement, 1997 to 2005
Alliances and small powers
The Diffusion of War
The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, 1969-1970.
The Israeli Concept of National Security
War and Reason
The Origins of Alliances
Alliances and Small Powers, by Robert L. Rothstein
The United States and the State Of Israel
A Tacit Alliance
National Security and Democracy in Israel
International Politics and Foreign Policy
Superpowers and client states in the Middle East
A Tacit Alliance
Israel, the Superpowers, and the War in the Middle East
The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics
Alliances and Asymmetry
General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals
| Unique citing works | 27 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,84 |
| Citation span | 1994 - 2026 (33) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 27 |