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A Probability Model of Credibility

Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Deterrence Systems

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6285751
AutoresClaudio Cioffi-Revilla (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign), Claudio Cioffi‐revilla (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, autor de correspondencia)
Año1983
Volumen27
Número1
Páginas73-108
Fecha de publicación1983-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002783027001003
OpenAlexW3124789128
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas5
Referencias citadas38

Credibility plays a central role in the classical theory of strategic nuclear deterrence, as well as in many types of social and international relations. This article presents probability models of credibility for survival-retaliation, Wohlstetter-type, and generalized “chain” deterrent threats. Both scenario and systems analysis of these models indicate that (1) only moderate credibility occurs even when very high levels of performance are insured in actions necessary to implement the threat; (2) variations in performance levels induce a destabilizing, more than proportional, amplified variation on overall credibility; and (3) this hyperweakening effect is largest in complex threats. In sum, intuitive estimation of deterrence credibility is severely unreliable, since credibility is weaker than the weakest link in a deterring chain of events. The models are extended and generalized to calculate the credibility of complex systems of deterrent threats, such as the “strategic nuclear triads” deployed by the United States, USSR, United Kingdom, and France, as well as other general deterrents having “serial” and/or “parallel” systems of threats. Special “bottleneck effects” induced by the National Command Authority (NCA) on C3I are emphasized

Bottleneck · Computer security · Credibility · Deterrence theory · Econometrics · Economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Computer Science · Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Nuclear Issues and Defense

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Obras citantes distintas5
Citas por año0,12
Intervalo de citas1984 - 2013 (30)
Velocidad de citaciónhistorical
Altamente citadoNo
Tipos de citaNeutras: 5
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