A Probability Model of Credibility
Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Deterrence Systems
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6285751 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Claudio Cioffi-Revilla (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign), Claudio Cioffi‐revilla (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 1983 |
| Volumen | 27 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 73-108 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1983-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Editorial | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002783027001003 |
| OpenAlex | W3124789128 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 5 |
| Referencias citadas | 38 |
Credibility plays a central role in the classical theory of strategic nuclear deterrence, as well as in many types of social and international relations. This article presents probability models of credibility for survival-retaliation, Wohlstetter-type, and generalized “chain” deterrent threats. Both scenario and systems analysis of these models indicate that (1) only moderate credibility occurs even when very high levels of performance are insured in actions necessary to implement the threat; (2) variations in performance levels induce a destabilizing, more than proportional, amplified variation on overall credibility; and (3) this hyperweakening effect is largest in complex threats. In sum, intuitive estimation of deterrence credibility is severely unreliable, since credibility is weaker than the weakest link in a deterring chain of events. The models are extended and generalized to calculate the credibility of complex systems of deterrent threats, such as the “strategic nuclear triads” deployed by the United States, USSR, United Kingdom, and France, as well as other general deterrents having “serial” and/or “parallel” systems of threats. Special “bottleneck effects” induced by the National Command Authority (NCA) on C3I are emphasized
Bottleneck · Computer security · Credibility · Deterrence theory · Econometrics · Economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Computer Science · Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Nuclear Issues and Defense
Theory and research on the causes of war
Strategy in the Missile Age
International Politics in the Atomic Age
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Deterrence and Defense
Political linguistics and events research
Diplomatic communication theory
"Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?" Adelphi Papers. No. 169
Retaliatory aggression in individuals and groups
Progressions in mathematical models of international conflict
Deterrence and Strategy
The Dynamics of the Nuclear Balance
Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War
Nuclear Decapitation
Why mathematical models
The analysis of international relations
The Calculus of Nuclear Deterrence
The Anatomy of Deterrence
A Theory of Bounded Deterrence
Deterrence and power
More calculations about deterrence
Threat-perception and the armament-tension dilemma
Prisoner's Dilemma" and "Chicken" Models in International Politics
Formal Models in Political Science
Fuzzy Sets and Models of International Relations
On Methods of Conflict Prevention
A Calculus of Military Stability
A Quantitative Conflict Model
Some Aspects of a Decision-Making Model in Nuclear Deterrence Theory
The Delicate Balance of Terror
| Obras citantes distintas | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,12 |
| Intervalo de citas | 1984 - 2013 (30) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 5 |