History, Quantitative Analysis, and the Balance of Power
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6285886 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alan Alexandroff (Center for International Studies Cornell University), Alan S Alexandroff (0000-0001-8411-6622, Centre d'études et de recherches internationales de Sciences Po), Richard Rosecrance (Center for International Studies Cornell University), Arthur A Stein (0000-0002-1955-2898, Yale University), Arthur Stein (0000-0002-3033-1201, Political Science Department Yale University) |
| Year | 1977 |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 35-56 |
| Publication date | 1977-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200277702100103 |
| OpenAlex | W1560525910 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 22 |
It is perhaps a paradox that history, the discipline which is closest to the raw stuff of politics, economics, and international affairs, has produced so little in agreed conclusions about such matters. Historians have managed to disagree about issues of great importance even though the data at their fingertips would seem to provide a substantial foundation for accord. Certain scholars have declared that World War I occurred because of an imbalance in international power (Hinsley, 1962); others have declared that it resulted from too great a balance (Langer, 1953). The question of responsibility for the war is still unresolved: Albertini, Fischer, and his disciples see Germany at fault; Langer, Fay, Turner, Ritter, and others believe the blame must be more evenly distributed. The divergence over World War I is magnified when one approaches World War I1 and the Cold War. Here revisionist contend with traditional interpretations, and there is no end to the argument in sight. Paul Schroeder contends in his companion piece in this issue that the assumptions and methods of our work in the Situational Analysis Project are questionable and fail to meet historical requirements. We propose to show in rejoinder that the assumptions and methods we have used are fully cognizant of the difficulties he mentions, and indeed have bcen designed to overcome some of the
Argument (complex analysis · Balance (ability · Blame · Economics · International relations · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Power (physics · Sociology · Anthropology: Ethics, History, Culture · History · Law · Psychology · Qualitative Comparative Analysis Research
The Balance of Power in International Relations
Measuring the ‘balances of power’
Toward Appropriate Peace Research
Historians, Social Scientists, and Crisis Management
Historical IR and the promise of renewed dialogue between IR and history
A Final Rejoinder
Conceptualizing “War
Case Selection, Conceptualizations and Basic Logic in the Study of War
Germany's Aims in the First World War
The Causes of War
The tragedy of American diplomacy
Power and poverty
Power and the Pursuit of Peace
European Alliances and Alignments, 1871–1890
Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House
A World Destroyed
The Politics of War
Bismarck
The Politics of War
The Politics of War
The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945
The Origins of the World War
Quantitative Studies in the Balance of Power
Responsibility for the Cold War - A Case Study in Historical Responsibility
"Further Reflections on "The Elitist Theory of Democracy
Nondecisions and the Study of Local Politics
Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin
| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,16 |
| Citation span | 1977 - 2026 (50) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |