Sanctions-Busting, Material Power, and Institutional Support for Economic Sanctions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6285974 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jin Mun Jeong (0000-0002-4973-9418, University of Seoul, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 67 |
| Issue | 10 |
| Pages | 1904-1929 |
| Publication date | 2023-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220027231154450 |
| OpenAlex | W4319793550 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 80 |
International institutions play a key role in sanctions success. However, little is known about when senders mobilize institutional sanctions and how they induce international institutions to support their sanctioning efforts. Senders may need institutional support when they expect third-party states to engage in sanctions-busting. I suggest that senders anticipate sanctions-busting when they face third-party rivals which also have an alliance tie with targets. The presence of such potential sanctions busters may lead senders to seek institutional support. Also, senders should possess substantial material power to induce member states of international institutions to approve the sanctioning efforts. I assess the theoretical claim of this research by analyzing 1,038 sanctions episodes over the period 1951–2005. The findings support my argument that senders pursue institutional support when they face potential sanctions busters, and the success of their efforts partly depend on their material power
Alliance · Argument (complex analysis · Business · Economic sanctions · Economics · Face (sociological concept · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Power (physics · Sanctions · Sociology · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · Law · Middle East and Rwanda Conflicts
Imperial State and Revolution
International Military Alliances, 1648-2008
The Sanctions Paradox
The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council
Ruling the World
Controlling Institutions
Busted Sanctions
Informal governance in world politics
Global horse trading
The impact of human rights Ingo activities on economic sanctions
Informal governance in international organizations
Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?
Coercive Cooperation
War and Peace in International Rivalry
Economic Sanctions, International Institutions, and Sanctions Busters
Informal Trade Along the China–north Korea Border
Trading Data
Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005
Solidarity, Sanctions and Misunderstanding
Neo-Kantianism and Coercive Diplomacy
Is the liberal peace just an artifact of cold war interests? Assessing recent critiques
Jumping into the Fray
Development aid and international politics
Weaponized Interdependence
How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations
U.S. Foreign Aid and UN Voting
Castro's Revolution, Cuban Communist Appeals, and the Soviet Response
Global Communications and National Power
What Is the Enemy of My Enemy? Causes and Consequences of Imbalanced International Relations, 1816–2001
Searching in the Shadows
Sanctions and Alternate Markets
Back to the Future
Sanctioning Violence
Reevaluating Alliance Reliability
Major Power Intervention in International Crises, 1918-1988
Expanded Trade and GDP Data
Unilateral Influence on International Bureaucrats
Alliances and Trade with Sanctioned States
Power, Wealth, and Satisfaction
Democracy, Political Similarity, and International Alliances, 1816-1992
International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and Institutional Legitimacy
The Costs of Reneging
Why States Act through Formal International Organizations
Vote-Buying by the United States in the United Nations
Unilateral Versus Multilateral International Sanctions
Validating Threat
Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered
Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics
Angling for Influence
Sleeping With Your Friends’ Enemies
Let’s Get a Second Opinion
The Politics of Shame
The Increasing Representativeness of International Organizations’ Secretariats
Enduring Rivalries
Democracy and Multilateralism
Alliance Reliability in Times of War
Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions
The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force
Coercion Through IOs
International Norm Dynamics and Political Change
Delegation to International Organizations
Audience Beliefs and International Organization Legitimacy
Clashes in the Assembly
In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the Gatt/WTO
Interorganizational Negotiation and Intraorganizational Power in Shared Decision Making
Kant We All Just get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace
Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict
The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics
When and Whom to Join
Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered
Power Shifts and Economic Development
The Hegemon's Purse
Designing foreign policy
Potential early phase success and ultimate failure of economic sanctions
Tracking organizations in the world
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |