A Behavioral Model of Coalition Formation
The French Apparentements Of 1951
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6286074 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mushin Lee (Korea Institute of Science and Technology), Howard Rosenthal, Howard L Rosenthal (0000-0001-5051-1341) |
| Year | 1976 |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 563-588 |
| Publication date | 1976-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200277602000401 |
| OpenAlex | W1912010195 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 18 |
The 1951 elections for the French National Assembly permitted the formation of distinct formalized coalitions in each of 95 multimember districts. The resulting coalition outcomes are analyzed via a behavioral model that emphasizes real-time constraints that are largely ignored by formal game theory. Other major features of the model include: (1) coalitions are built incrementally and without defection until a coalition controls a majority of the votes; (2) offers to prospective partners are constrained by a graph that represents ideological and other constraints; (3) offers are made probabilistically, proportional to the votes controlled by the potential allies; (4) reciprocated offers are necessary and sufficient for a coalition to form. Estimated with data from districts with five or fewer coalescable parties or lists, the model is validated on districts with six parties or lists. The model has modest explanatory power, its major failure suggesting the influence of political forces at the national level that are beyond the scope of the district level model. Quite speculatively, these national forces may have been essential to preventing De Gaulle's coming to power in 1951. The model attests to both ideological and opportunistic facets of Fourth Republic politics
Democracy · Economics · Explanatory power · Graph · Ideology · Multi-party system · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Scope (computer science · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
The theory of political coalitions.
A behavioral theory of the firm
Parliament, Parties, and Society in France 1946–1958
Viability, preference, and coalitions in the french election of 1951
Simulation in the Study of Politics
Prediction logic and quasi‐independence in empirical evaluation of formal theory
Prediction logic
Coalitions and payoffs in three‐person sequential games
Nominal and Ordinal Bivariate Statistics
Campaign Resource Allocations Under the Electoral College
France against Herself
Bargaining in a Three-Person Game
Prediction Analysis in Political Research
Rational Behavior in Politics
Game Theory and Cumulative Voting in Illinois
Parliament, Parties, and Society in France, 1946-1958
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,15 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2015 (10) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |