Mathematical Models of a Three-Nation Arms Race
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6286196 |
|---|---|
| Authors | J E Hunter (0000-0002-9693-2878, Michigan State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1980 |
| Volume | 24 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 241-252 |
| Publication date | 1980-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200278002400203 |
| OpenAlex | W2113519623 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
Three models of a three-nation arms race are presented: an all-against-all model, a model in which two nations are allied against the third, and a model in which one of the nations has a secret alliance with the other two. In the all-against-all situation, the model predicts an infinitely explosive arms race as each country fears an alliance of the other two. In the two-sided alliance, the model predicts that there will be an mitial increase until the weaker side approaches parity, after which there will be a mutual deescalation. If one nation signs secret treaties with each of the others, then it immediately deescalates. The other two nations then enter a two-sided arms race in which there will be an initial increase until the weaker nation reaches parity followed by mutual deescalation. These models suggest that two-way arms races would not infinitely escalate if it were not for the fear of third party alliances
Alliance · Arms race · Parity (physics · Physics · Political economy · Political science · Race (biology · Sociology · Game Theory and Applications · Gender Studies · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
| Citations per year | 0.1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1985 - 1994 (10) |
| Highly cited | No |