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How Oppositions Turn Authoritarian

Bibliographic Data

ID6287079
AuthorsDonghyun Danny Choi (0000-0002-0470-4158), Fiona Shen-Bayh (0000-0001-5243-2110)
Year2025
Volume36
Issue4
Pages75-91
Publication date2025-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of democracy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1045-5736 • E-ISSN: 1086-3214
PublisherProject MUSE (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1353/jod.2025.a970350
OpenAlexW4414670198
LanguageEN

Opposition victories after periods of democratic erosion are commonly portrayed as turning points that can help restore democracy. This essay argues that this optimism is often misplaced. An analysis of more than 40 elections in Africa since 1990 in which an opposition candidate defeated an autocratizing incumbent reveals that democracy stagnated or declined in half these cases. The authors attribute this pattern to two mutually reinforcing mechanisms inherited from the previous era of democratic erosion. First, new leaders inherit a landscape of weakened institutions—pliant legislatures, politicized courts, and captured state agencies—which are far easier to exploit for their own political consolidation than to rebuild. Second, years of repression teach opposition elites which legal and coercive strategies are most effective for ensuring political survival. This "opposition learning" encourages them to use, rather than dismantle, these authoritarian instruments once they are in power. Through detailed case studies of recent opposition victories in Malawi and Zambia, the authors illustrate how these dynamics operate in practice. Despite celebrated electoral turnovers, these new governments began to repurpose the tools of their predecessors, engaging in judicial manipulation, selective prosecutions, and the co-optation of state power. This combination of institutional inheritance and learned repression often transforms a celebrated alternation of power into a "smarter autocracy," illustrating why electoral turnover by itself is seldom sufficient to guarantee democratic recovery

Political Conflict and Governance

Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo

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