Democracy's Inevitable Elites

Bibliographic Data

ID6288563
AuthorsGhia Nodia (0000-0002-0873-918X, Ilia State University, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume31
Issue1
Pages75-87
Publication date2020-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of democracy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1045-5736 • E-ISSN: 1086-3214
PublisherProject MUSE (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1353/jod.2020.0006
OpenAlexW2999560769
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited5

Robert Michels's seminal treatise Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (1911) offers an important theoretical exposition of the core belief that underlies populist politics: namely, that the elites (inevitably) capture democracy from the common people. Michels's disillusionment with the elitist betrayal of democracy led the sociologist to embrace Mussolini's fascism, a biographical note that seems to validate contemporary fears about populism's logical endpoint. Our answer to the theoretical challenge raised by Michels's "iron law of oligarchy" is likely to depend on how we view representative democracy: Is it an inherently inferior alternative to direct democracy, at best a necessary evil in large and complex societies? Or is the representative character of modern democracy in fact a major asset, one that serves to correct inherent shortcomings of the classic democratic model

Betrayal · Democracy · Epistemology · Exposition (narrative · Law and economics · Oligarchy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Populism · Representative democracy · Sociology · Contemporary Sociological Theory and Practice · Law · Philosophy · Political Conflict and Governance · Populism, Right-Wing Movements

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