Postcommunist Central Banks
A Democratic Deficit
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6288918 |
|---|---|
| Authors | J Johnson (0000-0002-7548-7111, corresponding author), Juliet Ellen Johnson |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 17 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 90-103 |
| Publication date | 2006-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of democracy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1045-5736 • E-ISSN: 1086-3214 |
| Publisher | Project MUSE (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1353/jod.2006.0010 |
| OpenAlex | W2038415664 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 10 |
Both proponents and detractors of central bank independence (CBI) view granting central bank independence as a domestic decision made for domestic economic reasons after domestic political consideration. However, postcommunist independent central banks began their lives burdened with a dual democratic deficit. Not only were they predominantly developed by and for international actors, but this rapid process occurred without building significant domestic support for these institutions. This paper explores the problematic implications of this democratic deficit and discusses how central banks might be better incorporated into democratic polities without compromising their countries' economic health
Central bank · Democracy · democratic deficit · Development economics · Economic policy · Economics · Independence (probability theory · Monetary economics · Monetary policy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Economic Theory and Policy · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · Law
The Joint Vienna Institute
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Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes
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The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
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Competing Commitments
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Globalization Pressures and the State
| Citations per year | 0.35 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2006 - 2025 (20) |
| Highly cited | No |