Europe as a global regulator? The limits of EU influence in international food safety standards

Bibliographic Data

ID6289523
AuthorsAlasdair R Young (0000-0002-8056-9234, corresponding author)
Year2014
Volume21
Issue6
Pages904-922
Publication date2014-07-03
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of European Public Policy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1350-1763 • E-ISSN: 1466-4429
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13501763.2014.910871
OpenAlexW2057918870
LanguageEN
Citations received16
References cited37

The European Union (EU) is often depicted as global regulatory power. This contribution contends that this depiction, while not unfounded, is misleading. It aims to clarify under what conditions the EU converts its regulatory capability into influence. Specifically, it seeks to resolve the puzzle of the EU's poor performance in the setting of global food safety standards within the Codex Alimentarius Commission. The argument is deceptively simple. The EU's limited influence is due to it being a preference outlier. In a context where standards can be agreed by voting, the stringency of the EU's regulations, rather than being a source of influence, is a liability. This extreme case demonstrates that the EU's ability to exercise international influence is affected by the constellation of preferences and the distribution of power. This contribution, therefore, contributes to the emerging literature that contends that the EU's international effectiveness can be understood only with explicit reference to the international context within which it is operating

Argument (complex analysis · Context (archaeology · Economics · European commission · European union · Geography · International trade · Law and economics · Political science · Power (physics · Global Financial Regulation and Crises · Regulation and Compliance Studies · World Trade Organization Law

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