Honesty pledges for the behaviorally-based regulation of dishonesty

Bibliographic Data

ID6289563
AuthorsEyal Peer (0000-0002-9891-5297, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, corresponding author), Yuval Feldman (0000-0001-8416-865X, Bar-Ilan University)
Year2021
Volume28
Issue5
Pages761-781
Publication date2021-05-04
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of European Public Policy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1350-1763 • E-ISSN: 1466-4429
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13501763.2021.1912149
OpenAlexW3152566996
LanguageEN
Citations received14
References cited50

A common regulatory dilemma is determining how much trust authorities can place in people's self-reports, especially in contexts with an incentive to cheat. In such contexts, regulators are typically risk averse and do not readily confer trust, resulting in excessive requirements when applying for permits, licenses, etc. Studies in behavioral ethics have suggested that asking people to ex-ante pledge to behave ethically can reduce their level of dishonesty and noncompliance. However, pledges might also backfire by allowing more people to cheat with no real sanctions. Additionally, pledges' effects have almost always been studied in one-shot decision making without sanctions. We explore pledges' potential effects by manipulating whether pledges were accompanied by sanctions (fines) and testing their impact on sequential, repeated ethical decisions. We find that pledges can considerably and consistently reduce dishonesty, and this effect is not crowded out by the presence of fines. Furthermore, pledges also affect "brazen liars" who cheat to a large extent and also those who score low on tendency to follow rules and norms. We conclude that pledges could be an effective tool for the behavioral regulation of dishonesty, to reduce regulatory burden, and to build a more trusting relationship between government and the public

Affect (linguistics · Business · Cheating · Compliance (psychology · Dilemma · Dishonesty · Economics · Ex-ante · Government (linguistics · Honesty · Incentive · Microeconomics · Pledge · Political science · Public economics · Sanctions · Social dilemma · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Psychology · Regulation and Compliance Studies · Social Psychology

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