Shifting competences and changing preferences
The Case of Delegation to Comitology
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6289568 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Catherine Moury (0000-0001-5405-1493, Institute for Cross-Disciplinary Physics and Complex Systems), Adrienne Héritier (0000-0003-3629-6280) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 19 |
| Issue | 9 |
| Pages | 1316-1335 |
| Publication date | 2012-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of European Public Policy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1350-1763 • E-ISSN: 1466-4429 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/13501763.2012.677189 |
| OpenAlex | W2068278510 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 29 |
The article examines how changes of powers in the inter-institutional balance have affected the willingness of the Commission and the Council to delegate legislative power to comitology committees. Starting from the assumption that actors seek to maximize their institutional power in order to increase their influence over policy outcomes, we argue that changes of institutional rules affect their willingness to adopt legislation through comitology procedures. We examine the effects of the introduction of the 1999 comitology decision, which increased the competences of the Commission in the comitology procedure by abolishing the ‘double safety net’. We show that the Commission has proposed delegation to management and regulatory committees more extensively since the adoption of this decision. Surprisingly, the Council – which saw its own competences reduced by the decision – did not put up significant resistance to the more frequent use of delegation
Business · Commission · Delegate · Delegation · Economics · Legislation · Legislature · Political science · Computer Science · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research · Regulation and Compliance Studies
Unveiling Inconsistency
Where does implementation lie? Assessing the determinants of delegation and discretion in post-Maastricht European Union
When norms and rules collide
Legislative Scrutiny? The Political Economy and Practice of Legislative Vetoes in the European Union
Strategies in multilevel policy implementation
Bargaining, power, tactics, and outcomes
Institutions and Social Conflict
The Engines of European Integration
Regulating Europe
Deliberate Discretion?
The Powers of the Union
Delegating Powers
Evolution and the Theory of Games
Explaining Institutional Change in Europe
Evolution and the Theory of Games
The congressional foundations of agency performance
The Engines of European Integration
Explaining the European Parliament's right to appoint and invest the commission
Efficiency or credibility? Testing the two logics of delegation to the European Commission
Information, Commitment and Consensus
Delegating Powers in the European Community
Conclusion
Legislate or delegate? Bargaining over implementation and legislative authority in the EU
Contested Delegation
Delegation and constraints in the national execution of the EC policies
Control of the Commission's Executive Functions
Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies
Representation or abdication? How citizens use institutions to help delegation succeed
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
The Cement of Society
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,45 |
| Citation span | 2015 - 2021 (7) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |