The ECB and the inflation monsters

Strategic Framing and the Responsibility Imperative (1998–2023)

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6289862
AutoresAurélien Goutsmedt (0000-0002-3788-7237, F.R.S.-FNRS; ISPOLE, UcLouvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, autor correspondente), Clément Fontan (0000-0001-6283-8931, ISPOLE & IEE, UcLouvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)
Ano2024
Volume31
Fascículo4
Páginas999-1025
Data de publicação2024-04-02
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of European Public Policy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1350-1763 • E-ISSN: 1466-4429
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13501763.2023.2281583
OpenAlexW4388808676
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas9
Referências citadas47

The recent resurgence of inflation in Europe has led the ECB to increase interest rates and phase out asset purchase programs designed to address the effects of the Great Financial Crisis. This article investigates how the ECB adjusts its logic of responsibility throughout this series of crises. Using a topic model and in-depth analysis of speeches, we examine the ECB's strategic framing of causal linkages related to inflation during three historical periods: the Central Bank Independence (CBI) era (1998-2011), the secular stagnation era (2011-2021), and the new inflation era (2021-). Our findings indicate that modifications made to the CBI's causal linkages during the secular stagnation era shaped the ECB's framing of the new inflation era in a novel way. However, despite acknowledging difficult policy tradeoffs, which they tended to obscure in the past, ECB policymakers still seek to uphold the imperative of responsibility by adapting it to varying policy contexts

Economics · Framing (construction · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Credit Risk and Financial Regulations · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · History