Budgetary Negotiations
How the Chilean Congress Overcomes its Constitutional Limitations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6292618 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ignacio Arana Araya (0000-0002-8251-5598, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 213-231 |
| Publication date | 2015-04-03 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Legislative Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1357-2334 • E-ISSN: 1743-9337 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/13572334.2014.943491 |
| OpenAlex | W2094505797 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 17 |
Recent research suggests that the Chilean Congress is marginalised in the policymaking process, especially when setting the budget. This paper argues that previous studies have overlooked the fact that the legislature uses two amendment tools – specifications and marginal notes – to increase the national budget and reallocate resources within ministries. This behaviour contradicts the constitution, which only allows Congress to reduce the executive's budget bill. To test this empirically, a pooled two-stage time-series cross-sectional analysis is conducted on ministries for the years 1991–2010. The findings clarify how the legislature surpasses its constitutional limits and demonstrate that specifications are useful to predict when Congress increases or decreases a ministry's budget
Budget process · Christian ministry · Constitution · Constitutional amendment · Economics · Legislative process · Legislature · Negotiation · Parliament · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Referendum · Test (biology · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Public Administration
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Friends in High Places
| Citations per year | 0.78 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2017 - 2026 (10) |
| Highly cited | No |