Making Incentive Systems Work
Incentive Regulation in the Nuclear Power Industry
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6294571 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kuldeep Verma (0000-0002-8571-5624, University of Massachusetts Boston), Barry M Mitnick (0000-0001-6238-9689, Pittsburg State University), Alfred A Marcus (University of Minnesota System) |
| Year | 1999 |
| Volume | 9 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 395-436 |
| Publication date | 1999-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1053-1858 • E-ISSN: 1477-9803 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024416 |
| OpenAlex | W2325092370 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 35 |
Efforts to reform traditional command-and-control regulation have led to use of a variety of incentive programs. State public utilities have regulated experiments to replace some direct controls with performance-based incentive programs. To date, neither the theoretical literature nor the descriptive literature on regulatory performance has identified systematically the features that characterize successful incentive systems. In this article, we use the literature on agency and incentives to develop a core set of propositions that prescribes the conditions under which incentive relations function well; this constitutes a normative theory of incentive system success. We then apply this theory to assess regulatory incentive programs intended to improve efficiency in nuclear power generation. Using a 1987–1990 data set drawn from Department of Energy sources and Nuclear Regulatory Commission sources, we analyze the performance of nuclear plants subject to state incentive programs. Contrary to expectations, the programs did not enhance efficiency, and they even may have challenged safety
Agency (philosophy · Business · Commission · Economics · Function (biology · Incentive · Incentive program · Microeconomics · Normative · Nuclear power · Political science · Public economics · Variety (cybernetics · Work (physics · Computer Science · Engineering · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Regulation and Compliance Studies · Finance
Control
On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B.
Regulation and Administered Contracts
An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups
Theory of the firm
A behavioral theory of the firm
Complex organizations
Policy Analysis
Organizing for Collective Action
The Effects of Learning by Doing on Nuclear Plant Operating Reliability
Controllership in the Public Sector
Controllership in the public sector
Political Organizations
Pollution, Prices and Public Policy
Beyond Privatization
Profitability and Product Quality
Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory
The Economics of Discretionary Behavior
Principled Agents
Working in Practice But Not in Theory
Regulatory Compliance and the Ethos of Quality Enhancement
Goal setting and task performance
Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships
Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness
Complex Organizations
Incentives, Cooperation and Risk Sharing
The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis
Social Structure and Network Analysis
On the Social Control of Industries
The Social Control of Impersonal Trust
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,09 |
| Citation span | 2003 - 2026 (24) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |