How Competitive Is Competitive Bidding? The Case of the Single Regeneration Budget Program

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6295014
AutoresPeter John (0000-0002-7934-1187, University of Manchester), Hugh Ward (University of Essex)
Año2005
Volumen15
Número1
Páginas71-87
Fecha de publicación2005-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1053-1858 • E-ISSN: 1477-9803
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/jopart/mui004
OpenAlexW2042476407
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas12
Referencias citadas6

Governments think they can improve policies and get better value for money by asking organizations to bid for programs or funds rather than allocating them according to objective measures of need. This article seeks to evaluate this form of competitive bidding by exploring whether competition improved bid quality in England's Single Regeneration Budget program. After reviewing the main theoretical accounts, we argue that competition only exists at the margins where groups that would not otherwise get funded may move away from the sort of project they most wanted. Groups that wanted to carry out projects that the government finds valuable anyway will generally not have to compete with each other, and many other groups could have put in lower-quality bids to get the benefits of participation in the process. Using data from four years of the program, we show that there were some gains but that they were not great

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