Legislatures

This article addresses a gap in the literature on legislatures as organizations. Organization theory has focused on private firms. Theories of public organization have focused on bureaucracies. Political scientists use formal, rational choice models to study legislative institutions but are primarily interested in explaining individual, not organizational behavior. I suggest that organization theory, applied to legislatures, can provide some useful insights beyond the rational choice approaches predominant in political science. I apply an organization theory perspective, which I call interpretive theory, to engage the current debate among rational choice theorists over whether legislative organization is driven by member interest in policy outcomes or in political positioning—an argument most elaborately presented by Keith Krehbiel's information theory. I present an empirical analysis of information use by congressional committees from 1985 to 1994 to challenge Krehbiel's view and to suggest the utility of the organization theory perspective

Argument (complex analysis · Bureaucracy · Economics · Law and economics · Legislature · Management · Microeconomics · Organizational theory · Perspective (graphical · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Positive political theory · Public choice · Rational choice theory (criminology · Sociology · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research

• Party Polarization in Congress

  Open Access•Sean M Theriault•Party Polarization in Congress•2008

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• Polling and Policy Analysis as Resources for Advocacy

  H P Greenwald•Journal of Public Administration…•2003

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• Ritual Deliberation

  Open Access•Ana Tanasoca, Jensen Sa et al.•Journal of Political Philosophy•2019

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• Evaluation use and learning in public policy

  Open Access•Pirmin Bundi, Philipp Trein•Policy Sciences•2022

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• The Limits of Enforcement in Global Financial Governance

  Open Access•Devin Case-Ruchala, Mark Nance•International Studies Quarterly•2024

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• Alone in the back office

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• Organizations

  W Richard Scott•Organizations•1987

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• The giant jigsaw puzzle

  Kenneth A Shepsle•The giant jigsaw puzzle•1978

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• Information and Legislative Organization

  Keith Krehbiel•Information and Legislative…•1991

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• Institutions and Social Conflict

  Open Access•Jack Knight•Institutions and Social Conflict•1992

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• Organizations

  Pamela S Tolbert, R H Hall•Organizations•2015

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• Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics

  Open Access•Forrest Maltzman•Political Science Quarterly•1995

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• Between knowledge and power

  Open Access•Erik Alb k, Erik Alb�k•Policy Sciences•1995

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• The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets

  Barry R Weingast, William Marshall et al.•Journal of Political Economy•1988

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• One Bill, Many Committees

  Open Access•Roger H Davidson, Roger Davidson et al.•Legislative Studies Quarterly•1988

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• Parties and Committees in the House

  Open Access•David W Rohde•Legislative Studies Quarterly•1994

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• Comparing Committee and Floor Preferences

  Open Access•John Londregan, Jane Mcintosh Snyder et al.•Legislative Studies Quarterly•1994

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• A Model of a Legislature with Two Parties and a Committee System

  Open Access•John H Aldrich•Legislative Studies Quarterly•1994

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• Information as a Factor in Congressional Politics

  Open Access•Bruce Bimber•Legislative Studies Quarterly•1991

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• The Legislature and Distributive Policy Making in Formal Perspective

  Open Access•Melissa P Collie•Legislative Studies Quarterly•1988

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• Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous

  Thomas W Gilligan, Keith Krehbiel•American Journal of Political…•1989

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• Information Transmission in Debate

  David Austen-Smith, David Austen‐smith•American Journal of Political…•1990

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• The Analysis of Committee Power

  Keith Krehbiel, Douglas Rivers•American Journal of Political…•1988

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• Why are Congressional Committees Powerful

  Open Access•Keith Krehbiel, Kenneth A Shepsle et al.•American Political Science Review•1987

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• The Destruction of Issue Monopolies in Congress

  Open Access•Bryan D Jones, F R Baumgartner et al.•American Political Science Review•1993

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