A heavy hand or a helping hand? Information provision and citizen preferences for anti-crime policies

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6296412
AutoresDaniel W Gingerich (0000-0001-6413-6917, University of Virginia), Carlos Scartascini (0000-0001-7031-3983, Inter-American Development Bank, autor correspondente)
Ano2022
Volume42
Fascículo2
Páginas364-389
Data de publicação2022-06-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Public Policy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0143-814X • E-ISSN: 1469-7815
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0143814x21000246
OpenAlexW4226445251
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas5
Referências citadas52

Anti-crime policy is often unresponsive to reductions in crime. To address why, we provide a model and empirical test of how citizens’ anti-crime policy preferences respond to information. Our model shows that preferences for anti-crime policy hinge on expectations about the crime rate: punitive policies are preferred in high crime contexts, whereas social policies are preferred in low crime contexts. We evaluate these expectations through an information experiment embedded in the 2017 Latin American Public Opinion Project survey conducted in Panama. As expected by our theory, a high crime message induced stronger preferences in favour of punitive policies. Unanticipated by our theory, but in line with cursory evidence and survey results, we find that a low crime message did not induce stronger preferences in favour of social policies. These findings are consistent with policy ratcheting: punitive policies increase during periods of high crime and remain in place during periods of low crime

Criminology · Economics · Empirical evidence · Political science · Public economics · Public opinion · Public policy · Punitive damages · Social policy · Sociology · Crime Patterns and Interventions · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Criminal Justice and Corrections Analysis · Law