A Simple Model of Legislator and News Media Interaction
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6297915 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Brian J Fogarty (0000-0001-9563-218X, Department of Political Science, University of Missouri-St. Louis, St. Louis MO 63121, USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 5-24 |
| Publication date | 2009-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629808097282 |
| OpenAlex | W2120771203 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 25 |
This article examines the effect of a strategic news media on legislators' interactions with their constituencies. Specifically, legislators can only be constrained by constituency preferences over policies when voters have the information to hold legislators accountable for their actions. A strategic news media can provide such information in a constant and continuous manner unlike, say, challengers. This article addresses this scenario with several models. First, a signaling model is introduced with constituency preferences and a journalist's investigating and reporting strategies serving as constraints on a legislator's voting preferences. Results of the baseline model include a pooling equilibrium where legislators vote with the district and are always re-elected. Second, a basic ultimatum bargaining model is introduced to allow for collusion between journalists and legislators in the output of the news product. This extension highlights a pure strategy-separating equilibrium where an out-of-step legislator is able to secure silence from the journalist and win re-election. Finally, the role of multiple journalists covering a legislator is considered. Results illustrate that as the number of media outlets increases within a district, the quality of representation also increases
Cheap talk · Economics · Law and economics · Legislation · Legislator · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Pooling · Representation (politics · Sociology · Sophistication · Voting · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Media Influence and Politics · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Congressmen's Voting Decisions
Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability
Making news
Home Style
Governing With the News, Second Edition
Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States
The Market for News
Persistent media bias
Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy
Impact
When Can a News Organization Lead Public Opinion? – Ideology Versus Market Forces in Decisions to Make News
Congress, The Electoral Connection
Congress
Impact
Media Bias and Reputation
The Structural Determinants of Local Congressional News Coverage
Local News Coverage and the Incumbency Advantage in the U.S. House
All the News That's Fit to Sell
Press Issue Agendas in the 1982 Congressional and Gubernatorial Election Campaigns
When News Norms Collide, Follow the Lead
Press Secretaries and Media Strategies in the House of Representatives
The Mass Media and American Politics
| Citations per year | 0.27 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2011 - 2014 (4) |
| Highly cited | No |