Institutional interests and the politics of constitutional amendment
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6298901 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Anna Fruhstorfer (0000-0002-1193-2706, University of Göttingen and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany, corresponding author), Michael Hein (0000-0002-6438-4213, Adult Education Center Altenburger Land, Germany) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 229-244 |
| Publication date | 2021-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0192-5121 • E-ISSN: 1460-373X |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0192512119871323 |
| OpenAlex | W2982075963 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 24 |
Institutional interests are often the main determinant of day-to-day politics. However, do they also matter in the more consensus-oriented field of constitutional politics? To answer this question, this article examines the success and failure of constitutional amendment drafts. We reassess a hypothesis proposed by Donald S. Lutz more than 20 years ago, according to which the initiator of an amendment is a significant determinant of its success, that is, of its passing or not passing. This study is based on a unique dataset of successful and failed constitutional amendments, covering 18 post-socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe (1990–2014). We demonstrate that the chances of success for a given constitutional amendment are clearly driven by institutional interests: cabinet and presidential proposals have significantly higher chances of success than parliamentary and public initiatives. Additionally, success or failure also depend on the level of democracy and the rigidity of the amendment process
Amendment · Cabinet (room · Constitutional amendment · Constitutional economics · Constitutional law · Democracy · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Sociology · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Populism, Right-Wing Movements · Public Administration
Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes
The Endurance of National Constitutions
Coalition governments in western Europe
The politics of constitutional amendment in postcommunist Europe
The Birth of a Bipolar Party System or a Referendum on a Polarizing Government? The October 2007 Polish Parliamentary Election
Parties, rules and government legislative control in Central Europe
Why do Formal Amendments Fail
On the Effects of Legislative Rules
How to Measure Constitutional Rigidity
Semi-presidentialism, Cohabitation and the Collapse of Electoral Democracies, 1990–2008
Legislative agenda‐setting in parliamentary democracies
Judicial Instability and Endogenous Constitutional Change
Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |