Barriers to Entry and Political Competition
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6298934 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Randall G Holcombe (0000-0002-7038-0999, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1991 |
| Volume | 3 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 231-240 |
| Publication date | 1991-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951692891003002007 |
| OpenAlex | W2005106644 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 16 |
Models of electoral competition tend to focus on competition between parties, but there are more significant alliances among incumbents of different parties than between incumbents and non-incumbents of the same party. The coalition of incumbents uses barriers to entry to place challengers at a competitive disadvantage, which frees incumbents from having to strictly follow the desires of the voters. This enhances the benefits of holding office. Models of political competition that leave out the competition between incumbents and non-incumbents overlook the most significant dimension of political competition
Barriers to entry · Business · Competition (biology · Dimension (graph theory · Disadvantage · Economics · Industrial organization · Market economy · Market structure · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Economic Theory and Institutions · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
The symbolic uses of politics
The limits of liberty
Capitalism and Freedom
Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting
Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting
Why Regulate Utilities?
The State as a Firm
The median voter model in public choice theory
A note on seniority and political competition
Economic theory of democracy
Centralized vote-trading
Looking beyond reelection
On the Structure and Stability of Political Markets
The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs
The Decline of Party in the U. S. House of Representatives, 1887-1968
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,07 |
| Citation span | 1999 - 2026 (28) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |