Jobs in politicians’ backyards

Party leadership competition and patronage

Bibliographic Data

ID6299129
AuthorsOzge Kemahlioglu (0000-0001-7070-0844, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Sabanci University, Turkey, corresponding author)
Year2011
Volume23
Issue4
Pages480-509
Publication date2011-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0951629811416397
OpenAlexW2052610200
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited51

What are the factors that lead to variation in the clientelistic use of state resources in electoral contexts? In this article I provide one answer to this question by focusing on the role of intra-party politics and analyzing the empirical case of patronage jobs in the Argentine provinces between 1984 and 2001. Patronage jobs in provincial administrations help governors build political support both in their own party and with the general public. However, when governors need their party (leader)’s support for their political careers and when the national party leadership position is open to competition, they reduce their clientelistic efforts not to lose the party’s (or party leader’s) support. The statistical analysis of public employment confirms this prediction that patronage is lower when the party’s (or party leader’s) support is important for politicians and when the leadership position within parties is open to competition

Clientelism · Communism · Competition (biology · Democracy · Economics · General election · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Position (finance · Realigning election · Socialism · Split-ticket voting · State (computer science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Latin American socio-political dynamics · Law · Politics and Society in Latin America · Public Administration

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