A model of non-informational preference change
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6299277 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Franz Dietrich (0000-0001-5300-0109, London School of Economics, UK and University of Maastricht, The Netherlands), Christian List (0000-0003-1627-800X, London School of Economics and Political Science) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 145-164 |
| Publication date | 2011-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629810394700 |
| OpenAlex | W1866130364 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 21 |
| References cited | 29 |
According to standard rational choice theory, as commonly used in political science and economics, an agent’s fundamental preferences are exogenously fixed, and any preference change over decision options is due to Bayesian information learning. Although elegant and parsimonious, such a model fails to account for preference change driven by experiences or psychological changes distinct from information learning. We develop a model of non-informational preference change. Alternatives are modelled as points in some multidimensional space, only some of whose dimensions play a role in shaping the agent’s preferences. Any change in these ‘motivationally salient’ dimensions can change the agent’s preferences. How it does so is described by a new representation theorem. Our model not only captures a wide range of frequently observed phenomena, but also generalizes some standard representations of preferences in political science and economics
Bayesian inference · Bayesian probability · Econometrics · Economics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Preference · Representation (politics · Revealed preference · Salient · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Artificial Intelligence
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| Unique citing works | 21 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,31 |
| Citation span | 2010 - 2026 (17) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 21 |