Is There a Paradox of Voting
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6299342 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gordon Tullock (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1992 |
| Volume | 4 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 225-230 |
| Publication date | 1992-04-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951692892004002006 |
| OpenAlex | W2040635740 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 1 |
This paradox of voting in Arrow's theorem has hardly any application to voting in the real world. Arrow, in introducing his theorem, says specifically that it does not apply in those cases in which individuals do not vote according to their elementary preferences, but accept payment of some sort to vote against them. Since log-rolling is usual in most democratic legislatures, the theorem does not apply
Arrow · Arrow's impossibility theorem · Bullet voting · Cardinal voting systems · Democracy · Economics · Legislature · Mathematical economics · Payment · Political science · Politics · Social choice theory · sort · Voting · Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs · Computer Science · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Finance
| Citations per year | 0.1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1997 - 2003 (7) |
| Highly cited | No |