Policy choices in tough times
The case of democratization and currency defense
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6299353 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Byunghwan Son (0000-0003-0163-6986, George Mason University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 453-469 |
| Publication date | 2016-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0192-5121 • E-ISSN: 1460-373X |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0192512115587928 |
| OpenAlex | W2509638181 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 51 |
Do policymakers under financial and political distress make undesirable policy choices? This paper attempts to answer this question by studying the relationship between democratization and currency devaluation under speculative pressures. The central argument is that young democracies exhibit relatively high probabilities of succumbing to speculative attacks, as the political cost of economic adjustment needed for defense is relatively high for these nascent regimes. The paper further contends that this relationship is stronger when the regime can mobilize fewer resources to defend their currencies. To test these arguments, this paper uses monthly data for 117 countries from 1975 to 2008. The results from statistical analysis provide corroborative evidence for these arguments
Argument (complex analysis · Currency · Democracy · Democratization · Devaluation · Economics · International economics · Macroeconomics · Monetary economics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Regime change · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · Law
Democracy and Elections in Africa
Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes
The IMF and Economic Development
Currency crashes in emerging markets
Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions
A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises
Do Democratic Transitions Produce Bad Economic Outcomes?
The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements
The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth
Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies
Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
New Tools in Comparative Political Economy
Democracy and the Market
Small States in World Markets
Politics in hard times
The Fate of Young Democracies
The Logic of Political Survival
The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions
Democracy and Redistribution
Investors, turbulence, and transition
Explaining the duration of exchange-rate pegs
Democracy and dictatorship revisited
The Macroeconomic Consequences of Democratic Transition
A Rational Theory of the Size of Government
Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy
Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America
The Effect of Authorita rian Regime Type on Exchange Rate Policy
Statistical Backwards Induction
Measuring Transparency
To Devalue or to Defend? The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy
Regressive Socioeconomic Distribution and Democratic Survival
Distributional coalitions and other sources of economic stagnation
Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments
Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes
Societal Preferences, Partisan Agents, and Monetary Policy Outcomes
Exchange Rate Proclamations and Inflation-Fighting Credibility
The limits and rewards of political opportunism
Political Institutions and Property Rights
Economic Performance And Survival In New Democracies
Democratization and Economic Globalization
Thepoliticaleconomy Ofinternationalmonetaryrelations
Democracy and Economic Growth
Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies
Centripetal Democratic Governance
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,22 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2021 (5) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |