The Puzzle of Weak Pocketbook Voting
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6299367 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Robert Grafstein (0000-0002-7816-7092, University of Georgia, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 451-482 |
| Publication date | 2009-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629809339829 |
| OpenAlex | W2049101595 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 61 |
This article investigates why predominantly self-interested voters exhibit weak pocketbook voting. Focusing on the USA, it estimates partisan government’s impact on household income and, based on the Permanent Income Hypothesis, models the conversion of that income into consumption, the source of voters’ utility in the model. The analysis implies that pocketbook voting is weak because anticipated policy is already incorporated in household consumption plans. Sociotropic variables are more powerful because they determine the relative value of partisan policies in the longer term. Using PSID data, estimates of the US parties’ impact on income generate a measure of partisan utility differences. This measure enters into a probit analysis using 1952—2000 ANES presidential election data. The pocketbook measure performs as predicted both independently and in relation to sociotropic variables
Consumption (sociology · Econometrics · Economics · Government (linguistics · Macroeconomics · Measure (data warehouse · Microeconomics · Permanent income hypothesis · Political science · Politics · Probit model · Public economics · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth
Voting and the Macroeconomy
Econometric Analysis of Panel Data
Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy
Understanding Consumption
What is an oil shock?
Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians
Consumption Over the Life Cycle
Clarify
Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game
Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics
Economic Models of Voting
Theory of the Consumption Function
The American Political Economy
The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President
Effects of Transitory Consumption and Temporal Aggregation on the Permanent Income Hypothesis
Surprise party
Bread and Peace Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections
The VP-function
Redistribution and the income of the median voter
Consumption and Liquidity Constraints
Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous Consumers and Limited Participation
Is Consumption Growth Consistent with Intertemporal Optimization? Evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey
Social psychology, demographic variables, and linear regression
Estimation across Data Sets
The Rationality of Economic Voting Revisited
Elections and Markets
Economic self-interest and the vote
A retrospective on retrospective voting
Economic Perceptions and Vote Choice
Partisan Preferences, Electoral Prospects, and Economic Expectations
Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes
Heterogeneity in Perceptions of National Economic Conditions
Political Sophistication and Economic Voting in the American Electorate
The Impact of Personal and National Economic Conditions on the Presidential Vote
The Personal and Political Underpinnings of Economic Forecasts
Sociotropic Politics
Bankers or peasants revisited
The Ecological Fallacy Revisited
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,43 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2017 (6) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |