Ministrables and Government Formation
Munchkins, Players and Big Beasts of the Jungle
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6299378 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Laver (0000-0001-7515-9831), Kenneth A Shepsle |
| Year | 2000 |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 113-124 |
| Publication date | 2000-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951692800012001005 |
| OpenAlex | W2048193263 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 23 |
| References cited | 9 |
Many models of government formation pay particular attention to certain key political actors. Schofield, for example, uses the concept of the `core party', while Laver and Shepsle focus on `strong parties'. Such parties have an important position in bargaining over government formation because they are in certain circumstances able to form minority governments on their own. In practical terms, this implies controlling the entire political machinery of government without help from other parties. An important matter hitherto ignored in theoretical discussions of government formation is the possibility that actors with pivotal positions in such models may in practice simply not have access to the political resources they need to exploit these. There may well be `small' parties that are well located in terms of some model of government formation, but which cannot capitalize upon this position for lack of access to sufficient political talent. This paper explores the implications of this phenomenon for government formation, showing that the failure of one or more parties in the system to have sufficient political resources to control a national government single-handed can involve striking reallocations of bargaining power
Big government · Core (optical fiber · Economics · Government (linguistics · Government failure · Jungle · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Position (finance · Public finance · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Finance
Between Formal Authority and Political Practice
When Do Shadow Ministers Become ‘Realities’? Evidence from the UK, 1964–2024
Cabinets, Ministers, and Gender
Legislatures and Parliaments in Comparative Context
Parliamentary Debate and Job Market Signaling in Westminster Systems
Who gets the prestigious positions? Credentials and ministerial appointments in Africa
Moves on a Chess Board’
Challenges and Change in Party Politics
Critérios técnicos, políticos e dinâmica regional na nomeação de secretários estaduais
Most Common When Least Important
The Competent Cabinet? Ministers in Sweden and the Problem of Competence and Democracy
Drawing from the bargaining pool
Is the Grass Really Greener
Modelling Government Formation in Denmark and Beyond
Theories of coalition formation
Why so few, and why so late? Green parties and the question of governmental participation
Coalitions and Compensation
The Three As of Government Formation
The Declining Talent Pool of Government
Off With Their Heads
Reflection in the Shadow of Blame
The Attribution of Credit and Blame to Governments and Its Impact on Vote Choice
Do Women Need Women Representatives
Making and Breaking Governments
Cabinets in the Netherlands (1918–1990)
Dominant players and minimum size coalitions
Political competitition and multiparty coalition governments
Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios
The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies
Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes
A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems
| Citations per year | 0.96 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2002 - 2026 (25) |
| Highly cited | No |