Simultaneous and sequential voting under general decision rules

Bibliographic Data

ID6299451
AuthorsFriedel Bolle (0000-0002-7586-4693, European University Viadrina, corresponding author)
Year2018
Volume30
Issue4
Pages477-488
Publication date2018-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0951629818791041
OpenAlexW2612087649
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited6

In an economic theory of voting, voters have positive or negative costs of voting in favor of a proposal and positive or negative benefits from an accepted proposal. When votes have equal weight then simultaneous voting mostly has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium which is independent of benefits. Voting with respect to (arbitrarily small) costs alone, however, often results in voting against the ‘true majority’ . If voting is sequential as in the roll call votes of the US Senate then, in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the ‘true majority’ prevails. It is shown that the result for sequential voting holds also with different weights of voters (shareholders), with multiple necessary majorities (European Union decision-making), or even more general rules. Simultaneous voting in the general model has more differentiated results

Anti-plurality voting · Approval voting · Bullet voting · Cardinal voting systems · Condorcet method · Disapproval voting · Econometrics · Economics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Nash equilibrium · Political science · Voting · Voting trust · Weighted voting · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law

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