Subcommittee Agenda Control
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6299726 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Cheryl L Eavey, Gary J Miller |
| Year | 1995 |
| Volume | 7 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 125-156 |
| Publication date | 1995-04-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951692895007002002 |
| OpenAlex | W2003400505 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 32 |
The conventional wisdom holds that standing committees and subcommittees gain disproportionate influence over the policy decisions for which they have agenda control. Two solution concepts which make predictions about the influence of decentralized agenda setters are the structure-induced equilibrium (SIE) and the structural core; they differ in their predictions because the latter (but not the former) assumes that logrolling across agenda jurisdictions will occur. Experimental evidence suggests that agenda setters do bargain across jurisdictions (contrary to the SIE), and that the outcome of this bargaining process determines the value of agenda control to the agenda setters. When both subcommittee agenda setters have preferences that diverge sharply from those of the parent committee, agenda setters have an unambiguous incentive to cooperate with each other. When one subcommittee agenda setter has preferences more representative of the parent committee, the more extreme agenda setter is at a bargaining disadvantage
Control (management · Disadvantage · Economics · Incentive · Law and economics · Management · Microeconomics · Political science · Public economics · Setter · Economic Policies and Impacts · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration
Congressional Government
Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations
Coalition Forming Behavior
On the mutuality of interests between bureaus and high demand review committees
Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
The layered prisoners' dilemma
Why so much stability
Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice
Committees and the core of the Constitution
Pre-meeting discussions and the possibility of coalition-breaking procedures in majority rule committees
The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
Sophisticated voting over multidimensional choice spaces
Bureaucracy and Representative Government
The Power of Subcommittees
Rules of Method and Rules of Conduct
An Experimental Study of the Effects of Procedural Rules on Committee Behavior
The Analysis of Committee Power
Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative Votes
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
Effects of group identity on resource use in a simulated commons dilemma
Patterns of Distribution in Spatial Games
The Committee Assignment Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias
Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers
Bureaucratic Agenda Control
Covenants with and without a Sword
The Core of the Constitution
Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government
The Competitive Solution for N-Person Games Without Transferable Utility, With an Application to Committee Games
Committee Decisions under Majority Rule
| Citations per year | 0.1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1996 - 2026 (31) |
| Highly cited | No |