Public Policy in a Principal-Agent Framework

Bibliographic Data

ID6299812
AuthorsMichael Bergman (0000-0003-2589-2976), Jan-Erik Lane, Jan‐erik Lane
Year1990
Volume2
Issue3
Pages339-352
Publication date1990-07-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0951692890002003005
OpenAlexW1977711682
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited8

The principal-agent framework is a rapidly developing approach to the analysis of contractual relationships within the private sector. We argue that it should be a promising approach to the analysis of public policy commitments as well. As a matter of fact, it allows the statement of a number of basic public policy problems in terms of an integrated framework. The making and implementation of public policy involve fundamental contractual problems referred to as asymmetric information, moral hazard, bounded rationality and adverse selection. The Niskanen bureau model is a principal-agent model, but its general result is much more limited than previously recognized, which may be shown by employing the same mathematical structure as Niskanen himself uses

Adverse selection · Bounded rationality · Corporate governance · Economics · Economy · Incentive · Information asymmetry · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Moral hazard · Political science · Positive economics · Principal (computer security · Principal–agent problem · Public economics · Public policy · Public sector · Rationality · Statement (logic · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Law · Finance

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