The Influence of Governors on Veto Override Attempts
A Test of Pivotal Politics
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6300464 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Vicky M Wilkins (University of Missouri), Garry Young (0000-0003-0628-0931, George Washington University) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 557 |
| Publication date | 2002-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.2307/3598659 |
| OpenAlex | W4247267344 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 12 |
| References cited | 31 |
Using the “switcher” analysis developed by Krehbiel (1998), we examine the ability of Missouri governors to sway legislators on veto override attempts. Our initial results closely mirror Krehbiel's finding that the chief executive successfully achieves influence at and around the veto pivot, but these results change once we take into account the political party of the legislators. Governors are far more likely to influence legislators from their own party, regardless of legislator ideology. Our study provides a rare systematic analysis of gubernatorial influence in the legislative arena, while also contributing to the current debate over preference‐based versus partisan‐based theories of legislatures
Economics · Ideology · Law and economics · Legislation · Legislator · Legislature · Microeconomics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Preference · Sociology · Test (biology · Veto · Corruption and Economic Development · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration
Does the Presidency Moderate the President
Pivotal Politics as Normal Science
Vote Switchers and Party Influence In the U.S. House
The Politics of Pandemics
Term Limits and Legislative‐Executive Conflict in the American States
Dynamic rare decisions
Legislative override and particularistic bills in unstable democracies
Models of Vetoes and Veto Bargaining
States as Laboratories
The president in the legislative arena
On Buying Legislatures
Pivotal Politics
The Theory of Committees and Elections
The item veto in the states
Governors vs. Legislatures
The item veto and state government expenditures
Governors and Legislatures
The Item Veto and Expenditure Restraint
Gubernatorial Tools
Executive Vetoes and Legislative Overrides in the American States
Wisconsin Item-Veto Lessons
Parties and Committees in the House
State Legislative Professionalism and Gubernatorial Effectiveness, 1978-1991
Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting
Where's the Party
The Executive Veto in American States
The Transition to Republican Rule in the House
Buying Supermajorities
The Governor and His Legislative Party
The State Political Party and the Policy-Making Process
Changing Gubernatorial Power
The Governor's Veto in Pennsylvania
Executive Power and Public Policy in the States
| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,55 |
| Citation span | 2004 - 2023 (20) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 12 |