Limiting Party Representation

Evidence from a Small Parliamentary Chamber

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6300673
AutoresCampbell Sharman (University of British Columbia, autor correspondente)
Ano2013
Volume38
Fascículo3
Páginas327-348
Data de publicação2013-08-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoLegislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/lsq.12017
OpenAlexW1604437843
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas4
Referências citadas19

Parties are seen as vital for the maintenance of parliamentary government and as necessary intermediaries between voters and legislators; an elected parliamentary chamber not controlled by parties is highly anomalous. This study contrasts the party‐controlled Tasmanian lower house with its Independent‐dominated elected upper house and finds that the major source of constraints on party representation is not a clientelistic style of politics but the persistence of a distinctive institutional design and electoral rules based on fixed terms and annual staggered elections. The consequences of these rules are explored for their effects on voter choice and legislative behaviour

Democracy · Divided government · Economics · Government (linguistics · Intermediary · Law and economics · Legislature · Limiting · Lower house · Parliament · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Proportional representation · Representation (politics · Style (visual arts · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Gender Politics and Representation · History · Law · Public Administration · Social Policy and Reform Studies · Finance